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Across industries, this paper ﬁnds that the rate of investment-speciﬁc tech-
nical change (ISTC) is positively related to rates of entry and exit. This ﬁnd-
ing is consistent with industry dynamics along the balanced growth path of
a general equilibrium, multi-industry model of the plant lifecycle, in which
technology adoption is costly and the rate of ISTC varies across industries.
Results are robust to allowing for structural change induced by technological
progress. The model also generates lumpy investment as a result of technology
adoption by incumbents.
JEL Codes: L16, O33, O41.
Keywords : Entry, exit, turnover, investment-speciﬁc technical change, en-
try costs, vintage capital, embodied technical change, selection, obsolescence,
structural change, lumpy investment.
∗The author thanks Maggie Chen, Alain Gabler, Anna Ilyina, Boyan Jovanovic, Rachel Ngai,
Chris Snyder and participants at the Midwest Macro Meetings 2006 at Washington University in
St. Louis, the Society for Economic Dynamics Annual Meetings 2006 in Vancouver and the 2007
IZA-EUI Workshop on Firm Dynamics, Labor Markets and Growth for suggestions and comments.
Any remaining errors are the author’s. Contact: Department of Economics, George Washington
University, 2115 G St NW Suite 340, Washington, DC 20052. Tel: +1 (202) 994-6153. Fax: +1
(202) 994-6147. E-mail: roberto@gwu.edu.
1"[Innovations] are, as a rule, embodied ... in new ﬁrms which generally
do not arise out of the old ones but start producing beside them." Joseph
A. Schumpeter (1912), T h eT h e o r yo fE c o n o m i cD e v e l o p m e n t ,p 6 6 .
"To speak of technological progress in capital is simply to refer to
changes in the quality of capital goods ...The mix of capital goods, and
consequently the average quality change, varies greatly among industries;
h e n c es od o e st h ea v e r a g ep r o ﬁtability of replacement of capital. Indus-
tries in which average quality of new capital goods changes most will,
other things equal, have the highest replacement rate." Edward F. Deni-
son (1964), The Unimportance of the Embodied Question.
1 Introduction
Entry and exit rates diﬀer signiﬁcantly across industries. Over the period 1963-
1982, Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) ﬁnd that ﬁve-year entry rates in US
m a n u f a c t u r i n gd a t ar a n g ef r o m21% in Tobacco to 60% in Scientiﬁc Instruments.
High-entry industries are high-exit industries, suggesting that there exist industry-
speciﬁc factors that lead them to diﬀer systematically in terms of overall turnover.
At the same time, little is known about these factors.
This paper ﬁnds a strong, positive link between industry rates of entry and exit
and the pace of technical progress in the capital goods that the industry uses —
t h er a t eo finvestment-speciﬁc technical change (ISTC).1 In addition, in countries in
which the cost of entry is high, rates of entry and exit are suppressed in industries
with high rates of ISTC, further indicating that ISTC is an important factor in the
decision of whether (or when) to exit.
To the extent that a plant is locked into the vintage of capital that it uses,
technological improvements in the production of capital goods may eventually drive
the plant to obsolescence and hence closure. The paper formalizes this intuition
in a general equilibrium model in which changing the vintage of capital used by a
p a r t i c u l a rp l a n ti sc o s t l y .T h i sv i n t a g ei sr e f e r r e dt oa satechnology. In the model,
an establishment is a technology-manager pair: the manager accumulates expertise
with a given technology over time, and at any date may choose to upgrade to a newer
technology — at the expense of accumulated expertise, as in Jovanovic and Nyarko
1ISTC is measured using quality-adjusted capital goods price data, as in Greenwood, Hercowitz
and Krusell (1997) and Cummins and Violante (2002).
2(1996). The manager may also choose to close the plant at any point — opting instead
to open a new one, or to work.
If the technology at a given plant falls behind the frontier for its industry, its
proﬁts decline, and this decline is more rapid when the rate of ISTC is high. However,
if it is costly to return to the technological frontier, establishments may optimally
choose to lag behind for a while. This allows ISTC to aﬀect lifecycle dynamics,
the timing of exit, and hence the rate of turnover. When only new establishments
may implement new technologies, as in a prototypical vintage capital model, the
industry rate of ISTC is analytically shown to cause a higher equilibrium rate of
industry turnover. When incumbents too may adopt the frontier technology, in a
calibration of the model to US data, ISTC accounts for a signiﬁcant proportion of
the observed cross-industry variation in entry and exit rates. In addition, entry costs
disproportionately aﬀect turnover in high ISTC industries, as in the data.
It is natural to address the link between turnover and ISTC in a vintage-type
model. Indeed, the results conﬁrm a basic prediction of this widely-used class of
models. At the same time, an application of vintage capital models to the phe-
nomenon of turnover must overcome two obstacles. First, it is not clear that entry
and exit are essential for ISTC to occur as, in practice, incumbents regularly adopt
new equipment. Allowing new technologies to be introduced only via entry embod-
ies Schumpeter’s assertion in the epigraph, and greatly increases model tractability:
nonetheless, it is not clear under what conditions the predictions of a vintage model
for turnover are robust to allowing incumbents to adopt new technologies too. Sec-
ond, Bartelsman and Doms (2000) observe that, if entrants begin at the technological
frontier, they should be both larger and more productive than incumbents, whereas
it is well known that entrants are typically smaller than average.
The model overcomes these obstacles by allowing incumbents to update, and
by distinguishing between the productivity of each plant and the quality of the
capital that it uses. In this case, several mechanisms link turnover with ISTC.
One (already mentioned) is obsolescence: the more rapidly a plant falls behind the
industry frontier, the sooner it may cease to be economically proﬁtable. Another is
selection: in an environment with heterogeneous plants, the types of plants that close
when they become obsolete (instead of updating) may depend on the rate of ISTC. In
the calibrated model, the link between ISTC and turnover turns out to be mainly due
to obsolescence. The selection eﬀect is weak unless high rates of ISTC are also related
to higher adoption costs — as in, for example, Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997).
Interestingly, more rapid ISTC turns out to increase selection pressures precisely
when entrants are small relative to incumbents, so that hurdling the "obstacle"
concerning entrant size turns out to strengthen the relationship between ISTC and
3turnover generated by obsolescence alone.
In addition, allowing incumbents to update generates "lumpy" investment at
the establishment level well-known since Doms and Dunne (1998). This pattern is
typically modeled using non-convex capital adjustment costs, as in Khan and Thomas
(2007) among others. In the current model, even though adjusting the quantity
of capital itself is costless, the process of technology adoption itself generates this
pattern — based on "technology adjustment costs". The model then predicts that
industries that have higher rates of ISTC should display more "lumpy" investment
— a prediction that turns out to be supported by the data.
As suggested by the epigraph, the sense that there should be a link between
technical change and turnover goes back along way, and several papers do study
such a link, including Mueller and Tilton (1969), Geroski (1989) and Audretsch
(1991). However, those papers do not consider the rate of technical change as a
determinant of long term industry diﬀerences in turnover and, in particular, none
of them raises ISTC as an inﬂuence on lifecycle dynamics.2 Campbell (1998) argues
that ISTC may aﬀect the cyclical behavior of aggregate entry and exit and Samaniego
(2007) ﬁnds that turnover and ISTC are positively related in a calibrated one-sector
general equilibrium model, but neither paper attempts to account for long term
cross-industry diﬀerences in turnover. Jovanovic and Tse (2006) develop a model in
which new industries with a high rate of ISTC experience an earlier wave of capital
replacement: however, that model does not distinguish between exit and updating.
The model extends the framework of Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) to allow
for multiple industries and for technical progress. In a survey of entry and exit,
Geroski (1995) reports little success in relating diﬀerences in turnover rates to indus-
try characteristics, mostly measures of proﬁtability or entry barriers. In a general
equilibrium context in which entrepreneurs select their target industry, the model
s h o w st h a tt h e r ec a nb es i g n i ﬁcant diﬀerences in equilibrium turnover rates (based
on diﬀerences in lifecycle dynamics) even when there are no diﬀerences in proﬁtabil-
ity nor entry barriers across sectors. The model assumes a preference structure that
leads to stable industry shares: however, an extension shows that the results are ro-
bust to allowing for structural change induced by technological progress itself, as in
Ngai and Pissarides (2007).
Section 2 surveys the empirical relationship between entry, exit, and the rate of
ISTC. Section 3 introduces the model, while Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium
and Section 5 studies the relationship between ISTC and turnover in the model.
Section 6 concludes by analyzing the role of entry costs in the model, as well as
2Previous studies mostly focus on manufacturing data: the current analysis also considers entry
and exit data for non-manufacturing industries.
4structural change and investment lumpiness. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 ISTC and Turnover in the Data
2.1 Data
This section examines the relationship between turnover and ISTC in the data. First,
these variables are indeed related in cross section. Second, a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
approach exploits cross-country and cross-industry variation in entry and exit. See
the Appendix for further details on the data.
R a t e so fe n t r y ,e x i ta n dt u r n o v e ra r ed r a w nf r o mt h eE u r o s t a td a t a b a s e ,w h i c hi s
provided by the European Commission. It includes all establishments in the business
register for each of 18 countries over the period 1997 − 2004. Previous research on
entry and exit mostly focuses on manufacturing data. Since manufacturing comprises
less than half of GDP in industrialized economies, an advantage of the Eurostat data
is that they also cover service and other industries, providing a more comprehensive
view of entry and exit than most previous studies.
In what follows, the variable Entry is the proportion of establishments active at
ag i v e nd a t et that entered since date t − 1,a n dt h ev a r i a b l eExit is the number
of establishments that closed between t − 1 and t, divided by the number of estab-
lishments active at date t. Both of these are averages over the sample period for
each country-industry pair, to abstract from short term conditions. The variable
Turnover is the sum of these two measures.
For cross-sectional comparisons, the industry index of entry, exit or turnover is
based on the industry ﬁxed eﬀect in a regression of country and industry dummy









where Ic and Ij are country and industry indicator variables. The index of entry
for industry j is then the coeﬃcient αj, added to the coeﬃcient αc for the median
country.3
Following Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997) and Cummins and Violante
(2002), the measure of ISTC is the inverse growth rate of the quality-adjusted relative
price of capital used by each industry, as measured in the United States. To control
3This leads to a median industry turnover value among manufacturing industries that is very
close to the average turnover value in US manufacturing data used later in calibration.
5for potential simultaneity or lags (see Appendix), the industry value is the average
over the period 1987−1997, the decade prior to the entry and exit data. For robust-
ness, we will also consider the average over the entire post-war period 1947 − 2000.
The correlation between the two series is 91%, which supports the interpretation of
the rate of ISTC as a long-term industry characteristic.
A potential diﬃculty relating technical change to turnover is the suggestion by
Geroski (1989) that technical change may itself be a response to entry and exit,
rather than a cause thereof, so that industries that experience high rates of turnover
may generate a lot of innovation. This is unlikely to be true of investment-speciﬁc
technical change, however. Industry ISTC measures are essentially weighted averages
of ISTC measures for individual capital goods, where each good is used in many
downstream industries. Hence, the rate of ISTC in a given type of capital good is
unlikely to respond to conditions in any particular demanding industry.4 In what
follows, endogeneity is also addressed by measuring ISTC in the decade before the
turnover measures.
The cross-country regressions below use two entry cost measures — from Djankov,
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002), and also from the World Bank (2006).
Each reports the cost of starting a business as a proportion of GDP per capita. The
former is measured in the 1990s, and the latter over the following decade. They are
denoted ECDLLS and ECWB respectively. The correlation between them is 68%.
Another institutional variable used later as an instrument is legal origin, as reported
in the CIA World Factbook.
2.2 Results
2.2.1 Cross-section
Table 1 presents the industry data. Entry and exit rates are highly correlated, sug-
gesting that they largely reﬂect diﬀerences in long-term, within-industry turnover
rather than simply short term phenomena or structural change.5 Of the 153 possi-
ble country pairs in the database, 82% of the cross-country correlations in rates of
4Endogeneity could still be a concern if high-ISTC industries also generate a lot of innovation
themselves: however, Ilyina and Samaniego (2007) report that, among manufacturing industries,
there is no signiﬁcant relationship between ISTC and R&D intensity, as measured by the median
ratio of R&D expenditures divided by capital expenditures among ﬁrms in Compustat. Computing
this measure for the current industry partition, the correlation between ISTC and R&D intensity
is only 5%. Results are similar using the median ratio of R&D spending to sales.
5The correlation between entry and exit rates reported in Dunne et al (1988) for US manufac-
turing industries is 74%. Brandt (2004) ﬁnds a similar relationship in OECD data and in an earlier
edition of Eurostat which, as here, includes services.






































































Figure 1: ISTC and Turnover. The rate of ISTC is the average rate of decline in the
quality-adjusted price of capital used by each industry, computed using the procedure
and data of Cummins and Violante (2002). The rate of turnover is the industry ﬁxed
eﬀect based on Eurostat data.
turnover are signiﬁcant at the 10% level, 76% at the 5% level and 63% at the 1%
level. This indicates that there are systematic diﬀerences in entry and exit rates
across industries, so that the lifecycles of establishments in a given industry in dif-
ferent countries may have common, possibly technological, determinants.
Strikingly, Figure 1 and Tables 1 − 3 report that entry, exit and turnover are
very highly correlated with ISTC across industries — on average, and also at the
country level. The correlation between ISTC and turnover is about 50%,a n dt h eR2
is around 25%. This is true of manufacturing industries (45% correlation) and also
of non-manufacturing industries (56%).
7Table 1 — Annual % rate of investment-speciﬁc technical change (ISTC)
and turnover. ISTC is the quality-adjusted price of capital goods (relative
to non-durables) used by each industry in the US, 1987-1997. Entry, exit
and turnover are industry ﬁxed eﬀects plus the median country ﬁxed eﬀect
(Denmark), 1997-2004. Sources — Eurostat, Cummins and Violante (2002)
and the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
8Entry Exit ISTC
Turnover 0.96∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Entry - 0.67∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002)
Exit - - 0.49∗∗∗
(0.001)
Table 2 — Correlations between turnover measures and
ISTC. P-values are in parentheses. In all tables, one, two
and three asterisks represent signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels respectively.
Country Turnover Entry Exit
Belgium 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.47***
Czech Rep. 0.37** 0.27 0.33**
Denmark 0.70*** 0.65*** 0.75***
Spain 0.39** 0.47*** 0.03
Italy 0.70*** 0.67*** 0.44***
Latvia 0.29* 0.23 0.31**
Lithuania 0.34** 0.30* 0.12
Hungary 0.28* 0.38** 0.05
Netherl. 0.77*** 0.73*** 0.75***
Portugal 0.40** 0.37** 0.26*
Slovenia 0.25 0.30* -0.05
Slovakia 0.14 0.16 0.07
Finland 0.58*** 0.54*** 0.57***
Sweden 0.57*** 0.54*** 0.44***
UK 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.35**
Romania 0.59*** 0.55*** 0.21
Norway 0.59*** 0.54*** 0.43***
Switzerland 0.75*** 0.63*** 0.73***
Table 3 — Cross-industry correlations between ISTC
and turnover, by country. The correlation between
turnover and ISTC is signiﬁcant in 16 of 18 cases.
92.2.2 Diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
Research ﬁnds that the costs imposed by the regulation of entry vary signiﬁcantly
across countries. This suggests an indirect yet possibly powerful method for identi-
fying the determinants of industry turnover, by exploiting cross-country diﬀerences
in industry behavior and the regulation of entry.
Suppose that entry, exit, and technology adoption by incumbents all reﬂect proﬁt
maximizing choices made by entrepreneurs. For entrepreneurs, the opportunity cost
of operating a particular plant includes the value of closing the plant and opening
a new one. If the institutionally imposed cost of entry is high, this should increase
the value of incumbency relative to new entry and, to the extent that exit can be
delayed or avoided, may result in lower exit rates. This eﬀect is termed obsolescence.
In addition, to the extent that entry and exit reﬂect the introduction and replacement
of technologies, entrepreneurs may avoid a high entry cost entirely by adopting new
technologies at existing plants instead of exiting and (possibly) re-entering. This
eﬀect is termed selection. Hence, we might expect entry costs to reduce rates of exit
disproportionately in industries in which the rate of ISTC is high. If a signiﬁcant
component of turnover reﬂects long-run factors, this should also be the case for rates
of entry, and for overall turnover.
To test for these patterns, the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach pioneered by
Rajan and Zingales (1998) is adopted. Let yj,c be entry, exit or turnover for industry
j in country c.L e t Ic and Ij denote country and industry indicator variables, re-
spectively. ISTCj measures the rate of ISTC in industry j,a n dECc measures entry







αjIj + βISTCISTCj × ECc + εj,c. (1)
If entry costs reduce establishment turnover primarily in industries where the rate
of ISTC is high, then we would expect the coeﬃcient βISTC on the interaction term
between ISTCj and ECc to be negative. By controlling for industry and country
ﬁxed eﬀects, this should be the case regardless of other country- or industry-speciﬁc
factors that might aﬀect rates of turnover.6
6Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2004) also study the eﬀects of entry costs using a diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences approach. However, they use the turnover rate (measured in the US) as an independent
variable, interpreting it as an index of "natural" industry entry costs. Thus, their paper does not
study the determinants of entry and exit rate diﬀerences. In addition, only manufacturing data
are considered in that paper. When the industry share was used as the dependent variable instead
of turnover in equation (1), there was no impact of the interaction between ETC and entry costs
on industry shares, consistent with their results. When the industry share was included as an
independent variable it was never signiﬁcant.
10T h em a i n t a i n e da s s u m p t i o ni st h a tt h er a t eo fI S T C( o rt h er a n k i n g )i sa ni n d u s -
try characteristic that persists across countries. ISTCj is measured by computing
the quality-adjusted price series for diﬀerent types of capital, and creating an aggre-
gate for each industry based on the weights of each good in the input-output tables.
As a result, this assumption amounts to positing similar input—output tables across
countries, and similar rates of technical progress in any given type of capital across
countries. Since that the median rate of ISTC is about 4% per year, it is unlikely
that signiﬁcant diﬀerences in ISTC for the same industry across countries could be
sustained for long in the absence of draconian import restrictions.7
The coeﬃcient on the interaction term between ISTC and entry costs is negative
and signiﬁcant — see Tables 4−5. This is regardless of whether turnover, entry or exit
is the dependent variable in the regression. The fact that ISTC interacts with entry
costs to generate diﬀerences in both entry and exit rates supports the notion that a
signiﬁcant portion of cross-industry diﬀerences in turnover represents a steady-state
phenomenon. Repeating the regressions with ISTC measures from the entire post-
war period yields much the same results, consistent with the hypothesis that ISTC
is a long-run industry characteristic related to entry and exit rates. Results are also
robust to the diﬀerent measures of entry costs.
A potential concern in this context is policy endogeneity: it could be that en-
try costs vary across countries in a way that depends systematically upon patterns
of entry and exit, exogenously determined. For instance, if for some reason estab-
lishment turnover rates across industries are compressed (so there are fewer ﬁrms
experiencing very high rates of expected turnover), this may allow incumbents to
lobby more eﬀectively for the imposition of higher entry costs to discourage compe-
tition. A common instrument to control for this possibility is legal origin, see La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). The results when entry costs
are instrumented using legal origin are even stronger in many cases: the interaction
terms remain statistically signiﬁcant and increase in magnitude.
7Also, recall that ISTC as measured in the US is correlated with turnover in 16 of the 18 countries
in Eurostat.
11Table 4 — Eﬀect on turnover of the interaction between ISTC and institutional
entry costs, as measured by Djankov et al (2002). Country and industry ﬁxed
eﬀects are omitted for brevity. P-values are reported in parentheses, and are
corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White procedure.
12Table 5 — Eﬀect on turnover of the interaction between ISTC and institutional
entry costs, as measured by World Bank (2006). Country and industry ﬁxed
eﬀects are omitted for brevity. P-values are reported in parentheses, and are
corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White procedure.
13It is interesting to check the robustness — or generality — of the results by seeing
whether they hold if manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries are treated
separately. While results are weaker in the smaller samples, the sign and signiﬁcance
of βISTC persists. Another question is whether these results apply only to the small-
est establishments, or whether it is an industry-wide phenomenon. Entry, exit and
turnover rates are recomputed using only establishments with 0-4, 1-4 or 1-9 employ-
ees. The sign of βISTC remains negative but is only signiﬁcant when the entry cost
measure of World Bank (2006) is used, although the Djankov et al (2002) measure
is also signiﬁcant in the instrumental variables regressions. Thus, it is not the case
that the results are purely driven by churn at the bottom of the size distribution.
That results are weaker when only looking at small establishments is consistent with
evidence that small ﬁrms are particularly sensitive to short term macroeconomic
conditions, as in Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) for example, which would cloud the
eﬀects of long-term factors on their lifecycle dynamics.
Both ISTC and entry costs are normalized by their means and standard errors.
Hence, regression coeﬃcients can be interpreted as follows. According to the Djankov
et al (2002) measure of institutional entry costs, Sweden and Italy occupy the 25th
and 75th percentiles respectively. In terms of industry ISTC, the 25th percentile is
occupied by Transportation Equipment, whereas the 75th percentile is occupied by
Retail Trade. In the median country, if entry costs were to drop from the level of
Italy to the level of Sweden, the annual rate of turnover would converge between
transportation equipment and retail trade by 0.3%, according to the instrumental
variables regression.
The diﬀerence in annual industry turnover between the 25th and 75th percentiles
is 2.9%. Thus, the magnitude of the interaction between entry costs and ISTC is
an order below the magnitude of cross-industry variation in rates of entry and exit.
This suggests that the ranking of industries according to turnover should not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly across countries in spite of the interaction between entry costs and ISTC
— as reported earlier in this section.
3 Economic Environment
3.1 Overview
There is a continuum of plants of endogenous mass that live in discrete time, popu-
lating J>1 industries. Time is indexed by t and the length of time between periods
14is ∆,s ot h a tt ∈ {0,∆,2∆,3∆,...}.8 A plant is a technology, implemented by a
manager/entrepreneur with a degree of success that is stochastic yet persistent.
In the model, a technology is a level of investment-speciﬁc technical change.
There is a capital sector that converts the aggregate good into capital goods. The
eﬃciency of capital production diﬀers by industry and varies across technologies.9
To change the vintage of their technology, plants must update it: updating, however,
may decrease their expertise, part of which is vintage-speciﬁc. Also, at any point, the
manager may choose to close the plant if the payoﬀ from her outside option exceeds
that of continuation. As a result, plants may ﬁnd it optimal to be temporarily
"locked" into a particular technology, investing in capital of a type that is not at the
industry frontier, and eventually updating or exiting depending on the eﬃciency of
implementation.
3.2 Households and investment
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so that capital depreciates by a factor
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1 − e−δ∆¢
each period. Thus, at any date,
one unit of foregone consumption may be converted into x units of capital of type
x in any industry j. There is a frontier level of x which varies by industry, denoted
¯ x
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8The reason for this time structure is as follows. ∆ > 0 is convenient for calibration, and for
proving existence of the endogenous distribution of plants using standard recursive methods. On
the other hand, analytical results concerning obsolescence can only be obtained as ∆ → 0.
9The Appendix presents an extension in which some of the industries themselves produce capital
goods, and the capital used by each industry is a composite of these goods. The empirical results
apply when the manufacturing sector is excluded, so the model can also be interpreted as addressing
a more limited phenomenon applying outside manufacturing.
15T h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ei sρ. 1/κ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Each household begins period t with k
j
xt units of capital of each type (x,j).E a c h
type commands a rental rate ∆r
j
xt. A household is also endowed with one unit of
labor each period, which may be used to earn a wage ∆wt or used in entrepreneur-
ship. Households earn income by renting capital and labor to establishments, and
by earning proﬁts πt from the establishment it owns if the agent is an entrepreneur.





















xt + πt (5)
where lt is time spent working.
Agents select consumption, investment and labor allocations so as to maximize
(4),s u b j e c tt o(5).
3.3 Production
Each plant is characterized by a technology x, and the manager’s success in imple-
menting it zt.V a r i a b l e s zt and x deﬁne the plant, and may not be traded.10 The





t ,α k + αn < 1 (6)
where kt is the quantity of eﬃciency units of capital that it uses, and nt is labor.
Ajt = Aj0eςjt is a measure of disembodied technology. Thus, gj is the industry
rate of investment-speciﬁc technical change (ISTC), and ςj is the industry rate of
disembodied technical change (DTC).















Thus, although x does not enter into the production function, it aﬀects proﬁts
because it is the rate at which the economy can produce the capital goods that the
establishment uses, which is reﬂected in the equilibrium rental rate of capital ∆r
j
xt.
10Andre Faria (2007) develops a model of mergers and acquisitions based on the transferrability
of zt. The model abstracts from mergers as, empirically, they tend to occur in waves associated
with episodes of regulatory change: see Andrade et al (2001).
16In equilibrium, more eﬃcient technologies will be associated with cheaper capital,
providing an incentive to use the frontier technology caeteris paribus.
However, technology adoption is costly. At the end of any period, the estab-
lishment may choose to update its technology x to the frontier, at the cost of a
proportion ζl < 1 of its expertise zt. Thus, some accumulated knowledge may no
longer apply to the new technology.




,t h e ym a yo b t a i nan e wl e v e lo fp r o d u c t i v i t y
zt+1, drawn from a distribution f (zt+1|zt) with support zt ∈ [zl,z h], zl ≥ 0, zh < ∞.
Otherwise, with probability e−∆η, zt+1 = zt.T h u s ,i faﬁrm adopts a new technology
its expertise the following period is zt+1 = ζlzt unless it receives a new draw from
f, in which case its productivity the following period is drawn from the distribution
f (zt+1 ÷ ζl|zt). Assuming that
R
zt+1f (zt+1|zt)dzt+1 >z t, f may be interpreted as
a stochastic learning process.
Some authors have argued that the rate of ISTC is positively related to adoption
costs,11 which suggests that the adoption cost parameter ζl may be a function of gj.
Allow ζl = ζl (gj), where ζ
0
l (·) ≤ 0, so that the numerical experiments can assess
whether this relationship is important for model behavior.
3.4 Entry and Exit
Agents in this environment may either work, or create and operate up to ¯ c>0
plants. Creating a plant requires a delay of length d,a f t e rw h i c hp r o ﬁts begin to
ﬂow. Let E =1−e−ρd. E is the cost of entry. This formulation captures the ﬁnding
of Djankov et al (2002) that cross-country variation in entry costs largely takes the
form of bureaucratic delays.
Establishments start their lives with a value of zt drawn from a common distribu-
tion ψ, and with the frontier technology. At any point in time, the entrepreneur may
close the establishment, earning a continuation payoﬀ Wt to be discussed in more
detail below. Once born, establishments also close exogenously with probability ∆χ
each period, in which case the entrepreneur may return to work in any industry, or
open another plant. That entrepreneurs are not tied to any particular industry and
move in and out of the labor market is consistent with the behavior documented by
Lazear (2005).
In equilibrium, entrepreneurialism in any sector experiencing entry must carry
the same expected beneﬁt as labor. The return from operating an establishment
11See Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), Greenwood and Jovanovic (2001) and Bessen (2002).
17is stochastic: however, assuming complete insurance markets, there is no income
uncertainty for individual agents. Hence, in equilibrium,









ψ(zt)dzt (1 − E) (8)
Let ε
j
t be the mass of entrants at date t. If in equilibrium there is entry into any

















In equilibrium, prices pjt a r es u c ht h a tt h i sf r e ee n t r yc o n d i t i o ni ss a t i s ﬁed with
equality.
If agents participate in the labor force, they earn a ﬂow of income wt.E x p e c t e d








where i(t) is the interest rate at date t.
4 Equilibrium
Equilibrium decision rules imply a law of motion for the measure μ
j





where Γ aggregates the decisions of individual plants. At any date, let M
j
t be the











Thus, for ∆ > 0, Ξt−∆,t is the set of establishments that exited between time t−∆
and t,w h e r e a sΞt,t−∆ is the set of establishments that entered between those dates.
Let μ
j
t (X) be the measure of any set X ⊆ M
j
t of establishments. Thus, the share
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18Deﬁnition 2 A stationary equilibrium (balanced growth path, or BGP) is a measure





t=0 such that the labor
market clears, the measure replicates itself, all households maximize (4) subject to
(5) given prices and expectations, and aggregate output yt grows at a constant rate.
This deﬁnition is similar to that in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) except that
the model distinguishes between industries. Also, because rates of investment-speciﬁc
and disembodied technical change diﬀer across industries, relative prices will diverge
even along a balanced growth path (as in Greenwood et al (1997), for example).
Proposition 1 There exists a balanced growth path with positive, constant rates of
entry and exit into all sectors.
The proof of the proposition derives from a series of conditions that are then
shown to be consistent with equilibrium. First, for proﬁtability to be proportional
across industries requires prices to grow at a pace inversely linked to rates of ISTC
and disembodied technical change. Speciﬁcally, along a BGP,
pjt = pj0e
−(αkgj+ςj)t (14)
This implies that the decision problem of the establishment is stationary. The mea-
sure of establishments in a given subset of the type space is constant over time which,
in combination with the decision variables, enables an expression for μ
j
t —n e to fa
constant Q. Finally, for a given wage, product prices and demand are given. The
proof shows that there is a unique constant Q that clears the labor market.
Proposition 2 At any date, the rental rate of capital is decreasing in the vintage,
at a rate that is proportional to gj.
This result is central to the establishment dynamics of the model. Establishments
using more advanced capital beneﬁt through cheaper capital services than their com-
petitors. On the other hand, the fact that updating to the frontier is costly implies
that establishments gradually fall away from the frontier, whereas some of their com-
petitors — either because they just updated or because they are recent entrants — may
use more advanced capital than they do. The price of output declines along with the
cost of production across the industry, whereas any given establishment only beneﬁts
from decreased costs if it decides to update — which may not be optimal in every
period. As a result, gj introduces a downward trend in the marginal revenue product
of the establishment over time, net of other aspects of establishment dynamics.
19This also suggests that rates of entry and exit may not be related to the industry
rate of disembodied technological progress ςj, since it is not costly to adjust. Again,
the price of the output of industry j is driven by the dynamics of the industry as a
whole, implying that the price of output declines at a rate that oﬀsets ςj. However,
since all establishments are at the frontier with respect to disembodied technical
progress, this has no inﬂuence on their lifecycle decisions.
Lemma 1 On a balanced growth path, an establishment’s updating and exit decisions
depend only upon parameters indexed by industry j and the age of technology a,n o t
the date.
At any date, the value of an establishment may be written recursively, and re-
written in terms of the technology’s age a instead of the level of ISTC x.S o l v i n g
for optimal input use, the lemma shows that the establishment’s updating and exit
behavior is the solution to the problem:
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where T i st h ep l a n n e dp o i n ti nt i m ea tw h i c ht h et e c h n o l o g yb e c o m e so b s o l e t e .Πj






























































Let T∗ (∆) be the solution to the problem in equation (15) of when to update or
exit.
Notice that prices do not enter problem (15), as suggested by the earlier discus-
sion. A crucial reason for this is that the value to an entrepreneur of closing an
establishment is equal to the opportunity cost of entering other industries and, by
optimal sectorial choice, that this in turn is equal to the value of re-entering the
20same industry. It is not necessary that the entrepreneur be able to re-enter the same
industry, only that other entrepreneurs have a choice over which industry to enter.
Let Υ∗ ∈ {0,1} equal one if the plant optimally updates, and let X∗ ∈ {0,1}
equal one if the plant optimally exits. We are interested in which ﬁrm- and industry-
speciﬁcp a r a m e t e r sa ﬀect these rules.
Lemma 2 The optimal updating strategy Υ∗ is an (S,s) policy, censored by the exit
rule X∗,w h e r eX∗ is decreasing in zt.
Equilibrium lifecycle dynamics are as follows. The plant is born, and climbs a
(stochastic) productivity ladder while simultaneously falling behind the technological
frontier. Eventually, learning is suﬃciently oﬀset by price declines due to technical
progress at the industry level that the plant shrinks until it either updates or — if z
is suﬃciently low — closes.
Lemma 3 T∗, Υ∗ and X∗ are contingent upon zt and on gj,b u tn o tωj, Aj0, nor
ςj.
It follows from Lemma 3 and from the fact that equilibrium spending shares on
each type of good j are constant that:
Proposition 3 O naB G P ,e n t r ya n de x i tr u l e sd e p e n do ngj,b u td on o td e p e n do n
ωj (preferences), on Aj0, nor on ςj.
5 ISTC and Turnover in the Model
This section has several objectives. In a simple version of the model, equilibrium
entry and exit rates are proven to be positively related to gj. This result also holds
in a calibration of the general model to US data. In addition, plants in the calibrated
model turn out to display investment spikes when they update, and the presence these
spikes is also positively linked to gj.
5.1 Entry and exit in a typical vintage capital model
To characterize the impact of ISTC on the timing of exit, assume for now that:
Assumption 1 zl = zh,a n dζl =0 .
21Under Assumption 1, there is no learning and no updating. As in a typical vintage
capital model, only entrants have access to the frontier technology and, absent any
variation in zt, they are larger than incumbents. This focuses the model on when,
rather than whether,t oe x i t . A l s o ,l e t∆ → 0 so, in the limit, the updating rule
T∗ (0) = lim∆→0 T∗ (∆) is a continuous function of parameters.
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 1, T (0) is strictly decreasing in gj,a n dr a t e so f
entry and exit are strictly increasing in gj.
Corollary 1 Under Assumption 1, rates of entry and exit are strictly increasing in
the rate of decline of the relative price of capital experienced by each industry.
Two eﬀects impact whether high gj involves earlier exit. Establishments fall
behind the frontier at a rate that depends on gj, which encourages earlier exit.
On the other hand, a high value of gj also lowers the proﬁts from re-entry, which
discourages exit. The proof shows that the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second.12
The example above clariﬁes the dynamics introduced by ISTC, by abstracting
from other aspects of establishment lifecycle dynamics. In particular, under As-
sumption 1, plants shrink until they exit. David Evans (1987a) does ﬁnd that ex-
iting establishments tend to shrink in the periods before exit. However, surviving
establishments tend to grow over time, something from which the example abstracts.
To assess whether these results are robust to allowing for other dynamics requires a
calibration of the model, to be presented next.
5.2 The model with updating
Returning to the general model without Assumption 1, where zl ≤ zh,a n dζl ≥ 0,
suppose ∆ → 0. Now, establishments in industry i solve the problem:
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12Industries with a high capital share should also experience more entry and exit, something
that is consistent with the results of Audretsch (1991). This is because the rate at which a plant’s







T h ea n a l o g u eo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 can no longer be proven analytically. Still, two addi-
tional channels may aﬀect the industry rate of entry and exit. First, if plants may
update and may diﬀer in terms of zt, the set of establishments that exit may depend
on gj. The impact of this selection eﬀect on turnover is ambiguous, and depends









dg > 0, then higher rates of ISTC are associated with a larger set of establishments
exiting. z∗ is endogenous and depends on ψ,s oz∗ cannot be derived analytically.













It is straightforward to show that V j
z (0,z∗ζl) > 0,a n dt h a tV j
g is negative and larger
in magnitude for larger z.13 Thus, a higher value of gj leads to plants with a broader





provided that z∗ is "large" relative to the
shock values drawn by entrants. This dovetails nicely with the fact that low initial
shock values are a natural feature of many models that wish to match the higher exit
rates among entrants documented by Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989) among
others.
Second, there will also be a threshold z∗∗ such that establishments drawing z ≤ z∗∗




j (0,z)ψ(z)dz = V
j (0,z
∗∗). (21)
Clearly z∗∗ = z∗ζl so that, once more, dz∗∗
dg > 0 provided that z∗∗ is "large" relative
to the shock values drawn by entrants — and, since dz∗∗
dg = ζl
dz∗
dg the two derivatives
always share the same sign. Thus, depending on the form of ψ, higher rates of ISTC
may also induce stronger selection among ﬁrms, so that a larger proportion of the
type space exits instead of updating once its technology has become obsolete.
13See Lemma 4 in the Appendix.
235.3 Calibration
The model is now calibrated to US industry and macroeconomic data. Detailed data
on industry dynamics are mostly available only for the manufacturing sector. Hence,
the model is calibrated for a "typical" manufacturing industry, by assuming that gj
takes the median value for the manufacturing industry (the median and the mean
are both about 4%), and choosing the remaining parameters so that this industry
behaves as the manufacturing sector does on average. Varying gj while keeping other
parameters constant then indicates how much of cross-industry turnover diﬀerences
is attributed by the model to cross-industry variation in gj.
Period length is one year, and ∆ =1 .L e tη =1 . z is drawn from a grid of 100
points, where z ∈ [0,1].
Computing industry exit rates requires calibrating the distribution ψ of entrant
productivity and the process f that changes productivity thereafter. ψ is modeled
as a log normal distribution truncated at the end points, with mean μψ and standard
error σψ. f is modeled as a stochastic learning process, following the interpretation
of Dunne et al (1989) of the fact that ﬁrms tend to grow faster early in life. Assume
that
logzt+1 = ν logzt + εt+1
where the disturbances εt+1 are normal with mean zero and standard deviation σε,
but the distribution is truncated so that zt ∈ [0,1]∀t.14
To calibrate the model requires values for μψ, σψ, ν, σε, ζl, η, χ, E and ρ.S o m e
of these parameters can be mapped into the model directly from the data:
1. αk and αn are chosen as follows. A value of αn =6 3 %lies in the mid-range
of estimates of the labor share. As for αk, the Bureau of Economic Analysis
reports that income from equity and proprietorships has averaged 12% of GDP
since the 1950s. Identifying this with 1 − (αk + αn) yields αk =2 5 % .
2. ρ is the rate of time preference, which is related to the equilibrium return on
capital. Greenwood et al (1997) use a value of 7%. The US NIPA report
economic growth of 2.2% p e ry e a ro v e rt h ep o s t - w a rp e r i o d ,i m p l y i n gt h a t
ρ =4 .5%.
14To see how this is a learning process, consider this formulation:
logzt+1 =l o gzt − (1 − ν)logzt + εt+1
where εt+1 is drawn from a normal distribution, truncated so as to keep zt+1 ≤ 1. The extent to
which ﬁrms are likely to increase is lower depending on their size. If ν<1 then ﬁrms will be drawn
towards z =1 , which is the upper bound.
243. Waddell, Ritz, Norton and Wood (1966) report that it takes about a year to
set up a plant in most industries. As for institutional entry costs, Djankov et
al (2002) report that the formal cost of entry is under 1% of GDP for the US.
Hence, d =1 , so E =1− e−ρ. One year is also the time-to-build assumed in













Table 6 — Calibration parameters
The remaining parameters are matched so that the behavior of industry growth
rates is similar to a typical manufacturing industry, using simulated annealing — see
Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis (1992). These six parameters are μψ, σψ, ζl, ν, σε,a n dχ.
The six statistics to be matched are:
1. the exit rate among the young (establishments aged 0-5 years), as reported in
Brown, Haltiwanger and Lane (2006).
2. the average growth rate — from Evans (1987a).
3. the average growth rate among the young — from Evans (1987a).
4. the "lumpiness" of investment. Doms and Dunne (1998) report that the share
of plants experiencing an increase in the capital stock of 30% or higher is
6%.15 This requires the model to ﬁt not just the mean and standard deviation
15The published version reports a diﬀerent number, but entrants and exiters are excluded from
that sample. 6% is the value in the panel that includes entry and exit.
25of growth rates but also the skewness of the growth rate distribution. As
discussed later, lumpiness in the model is related to the frequency of updating
by incumbents.
5. the log standard deviation of growth rates — from Evans (1987b).
6. the average exit rate (Brown et al (2006)).
Table 6 reports the resulting parameters, and Table 7 the model statistics. The
matches are generally quite tight. Interestingly, average size among entrants is only
2/3 o ft h ea v e r a g es i z ea m o n ga l lp l a n t s . T h i si si ns p i t eo ft h ef a c tt h a te n t r a n t s
adopt the frontier technology, as in a canonical vintage capital model. The average
updating lag is 5.4 years, so that the "updating rate" (conditional on not exiting) is
about the same as the exit rate.
In the model, the exogenous exit rate is χ =8 .9%. Thus, annual turnover of
about 4% is endogenous and due to ISTC, the remainder being attributed to factors
that are not modeled explicitly. This implies that industry exit rates must be greater
than or equal to 8.9% in the model. The minimum long term industry exit rate in
the data (as measured by the minimum industry turnover rate divided by two) is
very close, at 8.7%.
Statistic US data Model
Exit rate (young) 17% 18%
Exit rate 16% 13%
Growth rate (young) 6% 6%
Growth rate 2% 2%
Growth rate, log s.d. −2 −2
Plants with investment lumps 6% 5%
Table 7 — Model statistics used in calibration.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Entry, exit and ISTC
We wish to see ﬁrst of all whether gj is positively related to entry and exit in the
calibrated model, which allows for updating as well as entry as a means of technology
adoption. If so, to what extent can the model account for cross-industry variation in






































Figure 2: Rate of entry and exit, depending on the rate of ISTC and on the relation-
ship between ISTC and adoption costs (θ).
Entry and exit rates are positively related to gj in the model. Cummins and
Violante (2002) report rates of ISTC ranging from 1% to 8% across industries. In
the model, this generates a range of entry rates from 11.8% to 13.4% per year. Thus,
even though most ﬁrms are in fact growing in the calibrated economy, and although
incumbents have the option to update instead of exiting, a higher rate of ISTC
nonetheless increases industry turnover. In the data entry rates range from 8.7% to
17.1%, so the model covers about 20% of the range. This is similar to the R2 of the
regressions between ISTC and turnover.
5.4.2 Adjustment costs and ISTC
Several authors have pointed out that higher rates of ISTC are likely to be related to
higher adoption costs. In a one-sector general equilibrium model, Samaniego (2007)
ﬁnds that allowing adoption costs to respond to the rate of ISTC can be important
for its impact on technology adoption decisions. Hence, allow ζl = ζl (gj), ζ
0
l ≤ 0.
Henceforth set ζl (gj)=¯ ζ +θgj, where for a given value of θ the value of ¯ ζ is chosen
so that ζl (gj) equals the benchmark value for the median gj.
Greenwood and Jovanovic (2001) ﬁnd that investments in information technology


















































































Figure 3: Decision rules for diﬀerent rates of ISTC gj and diﬀerent values of the
adoption cost parameter θ. The exit threshold z∗ is visibly more sensitive to changes
in gj when θ is high, whereas the date of updating or exit T∗ is more sensitive to gj
when θ is low.
of unmeasured adoption costs. When θ =8the diﬀerence between adoption costs
in an economy with gj =0 .01 and one with gj =0 .08 is a factor of 5. Considering
that information technology comprises over half of measured capital investment in
t h eU Ss u g g e s t st h a tθ ∈ [0,10] covers the empirically relevant range.
Since adoption costs discourage updating vis-a-vis exit, it is to be expected that
θ>0 might be associated with a wider divergence of cross-industry turnover rates
generated by gj.S e eF i g u r e2.F o rθ =1 0 , the model entry rates range from 11.4%
to 17.2%,w h i c hc o v e r s67% of the range of entry and exit rates in the data. Thus,
the model accounts for about 20%-70% of cross-industry variation in entry and exit
rates, depending on θ.
Selection and obsolescence play very diﬀerent roles depending on the value of θ.I n
the baseline, where θ =0 , selection plays very little role in the link between turnover
and ISTC. Observe the leftmost column of Figure 3, where the line separating regions
of the type space corresponding to exit and updating depend very little on the value
of gj. Similarly, in Table 8, only a very small proportion of plants lies between the
value of z∗ corresponding to gj =4 %and the values of z∗ corresponding to other
values of gj. There are large diﬀerences in proﬁtability between plants with diﬀerent
values of z and, when θ is low, z is the main determinant of which plants exit, whereas
28gj governs the timing of exit and of updating. On the other hand, for high values of
θ the proportion of plants aﬀected by the shift in z∗ is much larger, indicating that
selection has a greater impact. When θ is high, because updating costs depend so
much on gj, a change in gj also corresponds to an increase in the eventual costs of
continuation, which further strengthens the selection eﬀect.
By contrast, obsolescence is very important when θ =0 : observe the large dif-
ferences in the dates at which plants update or exit depending on the value of gj,i n
the ﬁrst column of Figure 3.W h e nθ =1 0 , these dates hardly vary with gj at all.
To sum up, high values of θ allow ISTC to account for the majority of industry
diﬀerences in turnover. On the other hand, if we focus on the proportion of industry
diﬀerences that can be explained by ISTC in the regressions, then the data are
consistent with low values of θ. Thus, the model suggests that obsolescence (not
selection) is the primary channel linking ISTC to turnover.
θ =0 θ =5 θ =1 0
gj =0 .01 0.8% 2.2% 2.9%
gj =0 .04 0% 0% 0%
gj =0 .08 0.3% 9.1% 32.9%
Table 8 — Proportion of plants aﬀected by the
equilibrium change in z
∗ relative to the baseline
value of gj,w h i c hi s0.04.
6D i s c u s s i o n
6.1 Structural Change
In the model, the rate of ISTC (gj) is positively related to turnover rates when ISTC
is embodied in the plant. In addition, the rate of disembodied technical change
(ςj) is not. This is partly related to the assumed preference structure, whereby
industry shares are parametrically determined. This is consistent with the absence
of a signiﬁcant relationship between industry composition and entry costs found by
Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2004). At the same time, Ngai and Pissarides (2007)
show that, when agents have CES preferences, a BGP is consistent with structural
change whereby industries grow or shrink as a share of GDP depending on their rates
of technical change.
Allowing for structural change leads to some new insights. Suppose as in Ngai











, ωj > 0,
J X
j=1
ωj =1 , υ>0. (22)
Along a balanced growth path, changes in product prices oﬀset technical change so
that equation (14) still holds. Consequently, along a BGP, all the results of this paper
continue to hold regarding the plant entry, exit and updating rules. However, if υ 6=1 ,
the existence proof of Proposition (1) w o u l dn ol o n g e rb ea b l et ot a k ee q u i l i b r i u m
sector shares as determined by ωi: shares would vary at every date. While hazard
rates are equal for all cohorts, entry and exit rates will no longer be equal at all dates
when there is structural change: entry will exceed exit in growing sectors. This is
because the size of a ﬁrm of type (a,z) in industry j will not change over time:



























i st h eg r o w t hr a t eo fp l a n t si ni n d u s t r yj.
Proposition 5 When preferences satisfy equation (22), a balanced growth path ex-





μ =( υ − 1)[(αkgi + ςi) − (αkgj + ςj)] (23)
Thus if υ<1, the number of plants in industry i will shrink relative to industry
j if and only if technical change (as measured by αkgi +ςi)i sm o r er a p i di ns e c t o ri.
T h eo p p o s i t eh o l d si fυ>1.I fυ → 1 then there is no structural change.
Structural change could alter the ability of the model to account for cross-industry
diﬀerences in entry and exit rates, for three reasons. One is that it allows diﬀerences
in ςj to aﬀect rates of entry and exit. If υ<1, this might counteract the results if
gi and ςi are positively correlated. Second, if υ<1, then industries with high values
of gi would themselves be industries that shrink, which would oﬀset the relationship
between entry and ISTC (although it might enhance the relationship with exit). The
opposite holds if υ>1. Finally, structural change implies that some industries will
be skewed towards (or away from) younger plants, and the eﬀect of these diﬀerences
in composition on equilibrium exit rates is a priori unclear.
The impact of structural change on the model results can be assessed as follows.
The model can be used to compute equilibrium behavior and hazard rates for each
industry using the values of gj in Table 1.T h e n , g i v e n a v a l u e f o r υ,e q u a t i o n
(23) indicates the gap between entry and exit rates for each industry, relative to a
benchmark. The benchmark used was the median value of αkgj + ςj. This yields
30t h eg r o w t hr a t eo ft h en u m b e ro fﬁrms in each industry. Then, given equilibrium
decisions rules, the law of motion for μ
j
t can be amended to account for the steadily
increasing (or decreasing) mass of entrants over time in each industry. Industry rates
of entry and exit can then be computed.
Values of ςj are drawn from the TFP growth estimates of Jorgenson, Ho, Samuels
a n dS t i r o h( 2 0 0 6 ) . 16 TFP and ISTC are uncorrelated in the data (−6.9%), suggesting
that structural change is unlikely to aﬀect results through variation in ςj except by
adding "noise." Let υ =0 .3.17 An issue that comes up is that the industry Computers
and Electronic Products is an extreme outlier in terms of measured TFP (9% higher
than the next highest industry), so that it was also an outlier in terms of structural
change in the model (it shrinks by 5% more than the next fastest-shrinking industry).
In the data this is not the case. This could be a measurement problem, or it could be
that the output of this industry has diﬀerent substitutability properties compared
to other goods, or is experiencing structural change for diﬀerent reasons over the
period during which entry and exit rates were computed. Thus, results both with
and without this industry are reported.
Model
With comp. Without comp.
Data Entry Exit Entry Exit
ETC 25% 37%∗∗ 55%∗∗∗ 71%∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000)
Entry 47%∗∗∗ 44%∗∗∗ 71%∗∗∗ 65%∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Exit 50%∗∗∗ 48%∗∗∗ 71%∗∗∗ 67%∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 9 — Correlations between model statistics and
the data, under structural change.
16Greenwood et al (1997) argue that TFP measurements that do not account for ISTC may
attribute a portion of ISTC to TFP. Hence, ςj is the residual in a regression of gj on the TFP
measure of Jorgenson et al (2006).
This exercise excludes Rental Services and Other Services as the mapping between the industry
classiﬁcation used herein and that of Jorgenson et al (2006) was unclear.
17Regressing αkgj +ςj on the diﬀerence between entry and exit rates reported in the data yielded
a value of υ =0 .67, with a P-value of 0.112. If the industry Computers and Electronic Products
was eliminated, then the value was υ =0 .89,w i t haP - v a l u eo f0.012. Ngai and Pissarides estimate
in a 3-sector model that υ =0 .3. Out of all these values, the one that yields the largest divergences
from stationary behavior is υ =0 .3.
31Results are reported in Table 9. Excluding Computers and Electronic Products,
turnover and ISTC are highly correlated even when there is structural change in the
model. Thus, model results are robust to allowing for technology-induced structural
change. Including Computers and Electronic Products, relationships are weaker
but still mostly signiﬁcant. Interestingly, the relationship with ISTC is weaker for
entry than for exit when there is structural change, consistent with the fact that the
empirical results are also generally weaker for entry than for exit.
6.2 ISTC, Lumpiness and Exit
Not only does a higher rate of ISTC lead to earlier exit in the model: among plants
that do not close, it also leads to earlier updating. This too has a signiﬁcant impact
on lifecycle dynamics, even though it does not lead to exit. Instead, it leads to a
signiﬁcant "spike" in investment at the establishment level.
It is known since at least Doms and Dunne (1998) that establishment level in-
vestment is "lumpy," i.e. characterized by periodic spikes. A "spike" is deﬁned as
a year in which investment expenditures exceed 30% of the establishment capital
stock. These "spikes" are generally modeled using non-convex adjustment costs as,
for example, in Khan and Thomas (2007). In the model, such spikes may occur
because of large changes in zt or because of updating but, in practice, all the spikes
in the benchmark economy are due to updating as variance in zt is relatively low.
Figure 4 shows that, in the benchmark economy (θ =0 ) , the frequency of invest-
ment lumps is positively related to the rate of ISTC. This is the case even when
adjustment costs are increasing in gj, except when θ is so high that updating is ac-
tually discouraged by increases in gj. This is intuitive, if turnover and investment
spikes both reﬂect signiﬁcant changes in the technology in use at the establishment
level. Thus, a positive relationship between the rate of ISTC and the frequency
of investment spikes can be viewed as an independent prediction of the calibrated
model, in addition to the positive relationship between ISTC and turnover.
To look at whether investment is disproportionately lumpy in industries with
high rates of ISTC, "lumpiness" is measured using US data from Compustat. Over
the period 1997-2004, identify whether each ﬁrm in the database experiences an
investment "spike", as deﬁned by Doms and Dunne (1998). The index Lumpy for
industry j is the proportion of ﬁrms in j that experienced any spikes at all over
the period.18 Compustat covers all publicly traded ﬁrms in the US so that, while
18"Investment" is DATA128 (capital expenditures) and "capital stock" is DATA8 (net property,
plant and equipment). The median annual industry value of this variable across manufacturing


























Figure 4: Investment lumpiness: the proportion of ﬁrms in the model economy that
display an investment "spike" each year, depending on gj and on θ.
not being a representative sample of US ﬁrms, ﬁrms in Compustat are likely to be
ﬁnancially unconstrained, so that their behavior reﬂects fundamentally technological
factors. The unit of observation in Compustat is the ﬁrm, so that multi-unit ﬁrms
may not display spikes due to aggregation. This may not be a concern as, to the
extent that plants run by the same ﬁrm share zt —t h ed e ﬁnition of a ﬁrm, according
to theories such as Faria (2007) and Hopenhayn (2007) — updating across these plants
will likely be synchronized. Nonetheless, lumpiness is also computed for small ﬁrms
only, as measured by employment. The disadvantage of the size-based measures is
that there are very few ﬁrms in Compustat in some industries below certain size
thresholds, so these measures are likely to be noisy. Table 11 shows that lumpiness
is indeed positively related to turnover and to ISTC, in spite of all these caveats.
Moreover, it is not related to the Jorgenson et al (2006) TFP growth measure, as
anticipated by the model.
33Size Turnover ISTC TFP
All .43*** .40*** .10
(.002) (.005) (.494)
≤ 500 .30** .36*** .18
(.028) (.007) (.193)
≤ 250 .25* .32** .09
(.100) (.041) (.546)
≤ 50 .27* .28* .11
(.071) (.074) (.455)
Table 11 — Correlations between lumpiness, turnover
a n dt e c h n i c a lc h a n g e ,b a s e do nU Sd a t aa n dt h e
rates of entry and exit computed earlier.
6.3 ISTC and Policy: An Application to entry costs
Section 2 reports that entry costs reduce turnover in industries in which ISTC is
rapid, compared to industries in which it is sluggish. The same happens in the model
economy. Raising the entry cost from one to two times GDP has two eﬀects. First,
it suppresses entry and exit in the model. Second, this drop is more pronounced for
higher values of ISTC: when gj =1 %entry drops by 1.3%,w h e r e a sw h e ngj =8 %
entry drops by 1.8%. These changes are smaller than cross industry diﬀerences in
turnover, so the model suggests that entry and exit rates should be decreasing in
entry costs, and more compressed when entry is costly, yet still increasing in gj.
This is exactly what we ﬁnd in the data.
A long-standing debate going back at least to Denison (1964) questions the policy
relevance of ISTC. The debate relates to whether changes in investment rates over
time are likely to change the distribution of capital quality enough to have signiﬁcant
macroeconomic impact: Denison (1964) suggests that changes in investment rates
should little aﬀect aggregate economic outcomes because of cross-industry diﬀerences
in the rate of ISTC. In the model, policy can aﬀect aggregates even in the absence
of any ﬂuctuations — because policy may aﬀect the lifecycle dynamics of plants and







































Figure 5: Rate of entry and exit, depending on the rate of ISTC and on the level of
entry costs as a percentage of GDP. The graph assumes that θ =0 . Flatter curves for
higher entry costs are consistent with the empirically observed interaction between
entry costs and ISTC.
35For example, consider the role of entry costs in the model. Djankov et al (2002)
ﬁnd that entry costs appear negatively related to GDP levels across countries. The
same may be true in the model economy: in Figure 5, an increase in entry costs delays
exit, so that a certain proportion of plants is operating with an older technology than
otherwise.
From the US NIPA, compute the share of GDP made up by each of the 41
industries in the data set (which map into the demand parameters {ωj}j).19 Given
the change in updating and exit behavior in each industry predicted by the model
based on industry values of gj, the change in steady state aggregate GDP can be
computed from a change in entry costs using these shares.
Table 10 reports that entry costs can have a signiﬁcant impact on GDP through
the obsolescence channel. According to the Djankov et al (2002) measure, institu-
tional entry costs range up to 80% of GDP per head (or d =1 .8)f o rc o u n t r i e si n
the sample, so entry costs can reduce steady state GDP by about 1% in the sample,
or up to 1.4% in an economy with entry costs of around 200% of GDP per capita
(or d =3 .0 as in Egypt or Vietnam). Thus, the eﬀects of high entry costs on GDP
through the obsolescence channel are of roughly the same magnitude as the eﬀects
of ﬁring costs found by Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) in a one-sector model, sug-
gesting that ISTC can be of policy-relevance even in the absence of ﬂuctuations in
investment rates. Interestingly, results do not depend on the value of θ: while the
link between ISTC and adoption costs is important for turnover, it does not appear
to be important for policy, at least as far as entry costs are concerned.
Entry cost d
θ 1.0 1.25 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
0 0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 -1.1 -1.4
5 0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 -1.2 -1.5
10 0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 -1.2 -1.6
Table 10 — Percentage change in GDP due to entry costs,
relative to GDP in the benchmark economy.
6.4 Concluding Remarks
This paper is motivated by two observations. First, cross-industry diﬀerences in
entry and exit rates remain largely unexplained. Second, vintage capital models
19This exercise excludes the share of GDP made up for by government services, which averaged
13% over the postwar period. ¯ c is set so that entrepreneurs compose about 2% of the labor force
in the benchmark economy, as reported by Gollin (2002). Then, ¯ c =0 .099.
36generally have a strong prediction: that, if technical progress is somehow embodied
in the plant, it should be positively related to rates of entry and exit. The paper
concentrates upon the case of technical progress in the production of the capital goods
used by each industry, ﬁnding support for this prediction. The paper thus draws a
relationship between entry, exit and ISTC, a factor that Greenwood et al (1997)
among others have found to account for a signiﬁcant portion of economic growth. At
t h es a m et i m e ,t h e r em a yb ef o r m so ft e c h n i c a lc h a n g et h a ta r ee m b o d i e di na s s e t s
other than capital per se. For example, it would be interesting to see how far one




The proof of Proposition 1 is a consequence of the propositions and lemmata below.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2. The household’s ﬁrst order condition for investment










where time subscripts are omitted for brevity. This is because the return to capital
must be equal and, since the cost of capital in terms of consumption is linear in x−1,
that means the return to a unit of capital must also be linear in x−1 for there to be
investment (or disinvestment) in all types. Moreover it means that the interest rate





























is the interest rate on capital of vintage zero. Thus, capital is relatively
more expensive to rent for plants with older technology. Note that τ here is deﬁned
as the date at which the establishment’s technology was on the frontier, and we can
rewrite the establishment’s problem in those terms instead of in terms of x.
37P r o o fo fL e m m a t a1 ,2a n d3 . Notice that production is a static decision. Thus





















so, plugging in this result yields










where rj0 = r
j











































Now, given that rj

















Suppose labor is the numeraire. Then the value of an entrant must be constant over
time, so that, if φj i st h eg r o w t hr a t eo fpjt then
φj = −gjαk − ςj,p jt = pj0e
−(αkgj+ςj)t (31)


































38or, setting γj =
αkgj






Thus, here, establishment proﬁts depend only on z and on the distance from the in-
dustry frontier. With this under our belts, we can write the establishment’s problem
recursively, impose condition (8) for industry j, and divide through by Bj to obtain
value function (15), which does not depend on the date, only on industry parameters.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . Corollary of Lemma 3
Proof of Proposition 1. First consider the measure over establishments at date
t0. It follows the transition equation
μ
j




















































where S is a Borel subset of the type space over z (redeﬁn e di nt e r m so fs)a n dT
is a subset of ages. Abusing notation somewhat, f and ψ are now redeﬁned with
respect to s rather than z.
This satisﬁes the requirements of Theorems 1 and 2 from Hopenhayn and Prescott
(1992), so a ﬁxed point μ∗
j exists and is unique, given a constant volume of entrants
εj.
Set the numeraire wt =1 . As shown by Ngai and Pissarides (2007) the consumer’s




ωj,s opjcj = ωjsc where sc is total
spending on consumption and the demand for each good j is cj = sc
ωj
pj . Hence,







j . Now in a BGP it must be that their income is growing. So, for
constant labor, need c
−κ
t wt/p to be constant over time, so gp = g−κ
c gw. Setting w =1
to be the numeraire, then gp = g−κ
c .R e c a l l t h a t pjt d r o p so v e rt i m ea tr a t e−φj.
Given a constant mass of establishments μ∗
j, real output grows at rate −φj,s ot h i s
equation holds provided cj0 = sc
ωj
pj0.N o wpj0 is given by the entry condition (8),s o


















so real consumption grows at a constant rate κ
P
j φjωj, and the share of each type
of good is constant and given by pj0. Notice that the output of each establishment
is not linear in pj0 (it is strictly convex) so that for any pj0 t h e r ei sau n i q u em a s s
of establishments in that industry that can satisfy demand for a given value of con-
sumption spending sc. (which pins down the entry rates εj). Conversely, given a total
mass of establishments sc and the distribution of establishments over industries is
given. Preferences are such that a constant share of income is invested, so it remains
to check that income is constant (in units of labor) and that the labor market clears.
Turning to the budget constraint, income in (in units of labor) is constant provided
the measure over establishments is constant. Income is linear in the total number of
establishments. Hence, the number of establishments that clears the labor market is
the equilibrium number, which leads to equilibrium values of income, spending, and
all other variables as above. Such a number exists because labor supply is inelastic
— see Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993).


















j (0,s)(1− E) (39)
Although this is a continuous time problem, it can be approached using discrete time
recursive methods. The ﬁrst order conditions for T given W are
se
−γjT + χW =( ρ + χ)W.
40so that T is decreasing in W.S u p p o s eW is the payoﬀ assuming that γj =0 .T h a t
is strictly larger than V j (0,s)(1− E), so the true solution (if it exists) necessarily
has T larger than T ∗∗, which is the solution to that problem.
Now consider the same problem subject to T ∈ [T∗∗,∞),a n dw r i t et h eB e l l m a n
equation
BV











j (0,s)(1− E) (41)
where B is the Bellman operator. Blackwell’s conditions are satisﬁed (because T is
bounded) so B is a contraction and the problem has a unique solution.
Let T ∗ be the solution. Its derivative with respect to g satisﬁes














































1−E − e−ρT¤ (44)

















































If there exist g such that Tg > 0 then there must exists a g such that T = ˆ T.
However, the only solution to this equation is ˆ T =0 ,a n dT is always positive, so we
have a contradiction. The remainder of the proof is to show that the steady state
entry and exit rate is increasing in T ∗.T h ee x i tr a t ea s∆ → 0 is lim∆→+0˜ ξ (∆)/∆,





eiε/χ ,s ot h a tlim∆→+0
˜ ξ(∆)
∆ = ξe−ζT∗.
Lemma 4 V j
g is negative and larger in magnitude for larger z.
Proof. Without loss of generality let ∆ =1and let β be the discount factor along
aB G P .L e tD(a,st)=U (st)−Es+1V (a,st+1). Then, if B is the Bellman operator,








W, ˜ D(a +1 ,s t+1)+




W, ˜ D(a +1 ,s t)+Est+1V (a +1 ,s t+1),
Est+1V (a +1 ,s t+1)
¾
where V is taken as given. B is a contraction that satisﬁes Blackwell’s conditions
and which can be shown to be increasing in s because both V and {γst+1 − γ−τst+1}
are.
Proof of Proposition 5. Note that price proﬁles (24) and (31) continue to apply,
so that Lemmata 1, 2 and 3 hold. Thus, given wt and setting it to one (as the
numeraire), the same market clearing price levels obtain as before. Consequently,
p l a n ts i z e sa r ec o n s t a n to v e rt i m ea l o n gaB G Pe v e ni ft h e r ei ss t r u c t u r a lc h a n g ea n d ,
as the labor allocation in one industry rises or falls over time, it is the number of
plants that adjusts accordingly. Let Tjt = e(αkgj+ςj)t. Following the proof of Ngai and
Pissarides (2007), it can be shown that relative labor allocations across industries





















42where cij is a constant that depends on initial conditions in each industry. Thus,





μ =( υ − 1)[(αkgi + ςi) − (αkgj + ςj)] (49)
Thus if υ<1, industry i will shrink relative to industry j if and only if technical
change (as measured by αkgi + ςi) is more rapid in sector i.T h e o p p o s i t e h o l d s i f
υ>1.I f υ =1then there is no structural change and we are in the case studied
earlier. Existence follows from Ngai and Pissarides (2007), which pins down the




Entry and exit rates are computed from Eurostat. An observation in Eurostat is an
"enterprise," deﬁned as "the smallest combination of legal units that is an organ-
isational unit producing goods or services, which beneﬁts from a certain degree of
autonomy in decision-making, especially for the allocation of its current resources.
An enterprise carries out one or more activities at one or more locations. An enter-
prise may be a sole legal unit." (Council Regulation (EEC), No. 696/93, Section III
A of 15.03.1993). Birth rate: number of enterprise births in the reference period (t)
divided by the number of enterprises active in t. Death rate: number of enterprise
deaths in the reference period (t) divided by the number of enterprises active in t.
Turnover rate: the sum of the birth rate and the death rate.
Cummins and Violante (2002) construct quality-adjusted capital goods prices for
2 6t y p e so fe q u i p m e n tg o o d st y p e s .T h ei n d u s t r yr a g eo fI S T Ci sb a s e do na g g r e g a t -
ing these prices by industry, using the BEA industry-level capital ﬂow tables, divided
by the NIPA consumption and services deﬂator. The measure can be constructed
with or without structures, following Cummins and Violante (2002) in using the of-
ﬁcial price series for structures. The empirical work was repeated using only data on
equipment, ﬁnding generally similar results, slightly stronger for the cross-industry
comparisons, and slightly weaker for the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences regressions.
The industry classiﬁcation of the BEA input-output tables (which are used to
construct the ISTC measure) and by Eurostat do not exactly coincide. The 41
industries reported represent the join of the two classiﬁcation systems.
A.3 Model with capital goods industries
Observe that the structure of capital accumulation in this model resembles that of
Greenwood et al (1997), except that there are distinct capital stocks for each sector.
43There is an additional diﬀerence between the two models. In Greenwood et al (1997)
there is only one technology for converting consumption into investment, which im-
proves over time. In this model, however, that is not the case: establishments have
a choice over this technology, whereas the set of available technologies expands over
time.
An interpretation of the capital accumulation structure is as follows. Suppose
there are NK types of capital good. Each industry j uses an industry-speciﬁc capital
composite based on these NK goods. The frontier productivity of each capital type
k ∈ NK improves over time. Thus, at any date, one unit of the numeraire may be
used to produce Akτ = Ak0eςkτ units of capital of type k, vintage τ.L e t q
j
τt equal























ωjk =1 . (51)

























jt is the shadow price of the capital composite used by industry j,o fv i n t a g e










so that the share of spending on each type is ωjk. So, if total spending on new capital






































44so that the growth rate in the relative price of composite capital used by any industry
i st h ea v e r a g eo ft h eg r o w t hr a t ei nt h ep r i c e so ft h eg o o d su s e d ,w e i g h t e db yt h e i r
shares. This is exactly how the relative price series are constructed in the empirical
section of this paper, following Cummins and Violante (2002).
Under this interpretation, it is straightforward to show that the relative price of





Thus, ISTC represents nothing other than increases in the eﬃciency of capital good
production.
Alternatively, the model economy could be written to explicitly contain Nk capital-
producing industries, although not doing so signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes the exposition.
Suppose that there are J consumption industries as before, and also Nk capital-
producing industries. In each industry there is a disembodied productivity frontier
Ajt = Aj0eςjt,a n dﬁrms may produce goods using any technology Ajτ ≤ Ajt.T h e r e
is a price pτ
jt for each good, that may vary by vintage τ.
For consumption goods, at any date, for any two vintages τ and τ0,p r i c e sw i l l
be proportional to Ajτ and Ajτ0. As a result, consumers will not purchase goods
of any vintage τ<t . For capital goods, on the other hand, this is not necessarily
t h ec a s e( a sb e f o r e ) ,b e c a u s eﬁrms are temporarily locked into their capital vintage.
Regardless of which vintage a capital goods ﬁrm chooses to produce, however, it will
make the same proﬁts, because free entry implies that Ajτpτ
jt = Ajτ0pτ0
jt,s om a r g i n a l
revenue products are the same regardless of the vintage produced.
The existence proof then needs to change in two ways. First, gj must be derived
from ςk for the capital-producing industries. This involves some simple matrix alge-
bra. Second, for given aggregate spending, we know how much spending there will
be on capital goods of each type from the NIPA. Since this is linear in the number
of ﬁrms, this does not complicate the proof.
One last diﬀerence concerns the reversibility of investment. If capital goods de-
preciate more slowly than the rate at which demand for them decreases over time,
then the equilibrium time paths of capital goods prices may not be exponential if in-
vestment is not reversible. For these time paths to hold, investment in capital goods
must be reversible according to the same marginal rates of transformation used to
create them.
Thus, the model with capital goods amounts to assuming that (a) investment is
reversible, and (b) ﬁrms may produce any vintage of their good.
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